Via Bruce Schneier's indispensable Crypto-Gram (sign up for this emailed monthly security-minded newsletter here), I found a fascinating bit of musing by Susan Crawford, a professor of Internet and communications law. She wonders whether the appearance of front-page "Internet surveillance" stories in the New York Times is part of a campaign to build public support for adding measures to the public Internet that would allow for more intrusive monitoring of communications by law enforcement and the military. These measures would also form part of what cyber-warfare advocates claim are the capabilities needed to wage such warfare.
Along the same lines (at least, I think so; I haven't finished it yet) is a New Yorker piece by Seymour Hersh entitled, "The Online Threat." Hersh is a journalist with a reputation for digging out inconvenient facts from government sources, so I've no doubt there are disturbing but important (and likely inconvenient) facts to be gleaned here.
Crawford mentions that law enforcement and the military are looking for ways to introduce "back doors" into software that would allow duly authorized officials to slip into systems when necessary. (Of course, they or a similarly unaccountable person or persons decide when it is necessary.) The trouble, as a few commenters to Crawford's piece point out, is that the minute you introduce such a back door, it becomes available for an enemy to use, too. A system that provides greater privacy thus might provide greater overall security, too. (Schneier, by the way, is superb at finding and explaining the unanticipated or overlooked shortcomings of security systems and processes, which is why everyone should read everything the man writes.)
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